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Fix account editing and hijacking vulnerability
Checks are in place to avoid users getting account editing forms they shouldn't have access to. The appropriate checks before editing the account in the backend are not in place. This vulnerability allows a user to craft malicious POST data to edit other user accounts, thereby allowing account hijacking. Add a new flexible function can_edit_account() to determine if a user has appropriate permissions. Run the permission check before processing any account information in the backend. Signed-off-by: canyonknight <canyonknight@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Lukas Fleischer <archlinux@cryptocrack.de>
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2 changed files with 37 additions and 3 deletions
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@ -73,9 +73,14 @@ if (isset($_COOKIE["AURSID"])) {
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}
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} elseif ($action == "UpdateAccount") {
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# user is submitting their modifications to an existing account
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#
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if (check_token()) {
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$uid = uid_from_sid($_COOKIE['AURSID']);
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/* Details for account being updated */
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$acctinfo = account_details(in_request('ID'), in_request('U'));
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/* Verify user permissions and that the request is a valid POST */
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if (can_edit_account($atype, $acctinfo, $uid) && check_token()) {
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/* Update the details for the existing account */
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process_account_form($atype, "edit", "UpdateAccount",
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in_request("U"), in_request("T"), in_request("S"),
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in_request("E"), in_request("P"), in_request("C"),
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