aurweb/scripts/git-integration/0001-Patch-sshd-for-the-AUR.patch

From e23745b61a46f034bca3cab9936c24c249afdc7f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lukas Fleischer <archlinux@cryptocrack.de>
Date: Sun, 21 Dec 2014 22:17:48 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Patch sshd for the AUR

* Add SSH_KEY_FINGERPRINT and SSH_KEY variables to the environment of
  the AuthorizedKeysCommand which allows for efficiently looking up SSH
  keys in the AUR database.

* Remove the secure path check for the AuthorizedKeysCommand. We are
  running the sshd under a non-privileged user who has as little
  permissions as possible. In particular, he does not own the directory
  that contains the scripts for the Git backend.

* Prevent from running the sshd as root.

Signed-off-by: Lukas Fleischer <archlinux@cryptocrack.de>
---
 auth2-pubkey.c | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 ssh.h          | 12 ++++++++++++
 sshd.c         |  5 +++++
 sshd_config.5  |  5 +++++
 4 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
index 0a3c1de..baf4922 100644
--- a/auth2-pubkey.c
+++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
@@ -510,6 +510,8 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, Key *key)
 	int status, devnull, p[2], i;
 	pid_t pid;
 	char *username, errmsg[512];
+	struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *bb = NULL;
+	char *keytext, *uu = NULL;
 
 	if (options.authorized_keys_command == NULL ||
 	    options.authorized_keys_command[0] != '/')
@@ -538,11 +540,6 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, Key *key)
 		    options.authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));
 		goto out;
 	}
-	if (auth_secure_path(options.authorized_keys_command, &st, NULL, 0,
-	    errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) {
-		error("Unsafe AuthorizedKeysCommand: %s", errmsg);
-		goto out;
-	}
 
 	if (pipe(p) != 0) {
 		error("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
@@ -568,6 +565,47 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, Key *key)
 		for (i = 0; i < NSIG; i++)
 			signal(i, SIG_DFL);
 
+		keytext = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+		if (setenv(SSH_KEY_FINGERPRINT_ENV_NAME, keytext, 1) == -1) {
+			error("%s: setenv: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+			_exit(1);
+		}
+
+		if (!(b = sshbuf_new()) || !(bb = sshbuf_new())) {
+			error("%s: sshbuf_new: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+			_exit(1);
+		}
+		if (sshkey_to_blob_buf(key, bb) != 0) {
+			error("%s: sshkey_to_blob_buf: %s", __func__,
+			    strerror(errno));
+			_exit(1);
+		}
+		if (!(uu = sshbuf_dtob64(bb))) {
+			error("%s: sshbuf_dtob64: %s", __func__,
+			    strerror(errno));
+			_exit(1);
+		}
+		if (sshbuf_putf(b, "%s ", sshkey_ssh_name(key))) {
+			error("%s: sshbuf_putf: %s", __func__,
+			    strerror(errno));
+			_exit(1);
+		}
+		if (sshbuf_put(b, uu, strlen(uu) + 1)) {
+			error("%s: sshbuf_put: %s", __func__,
+			    strerror(errno));
+			_exit(1);
+		}
+		if (setenv(SSH_KEY_ENV_NAME, sshbuf_ptr(b), 1) == -1) {
+			error("%s: setenv: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+			_exit(1);
+		}
+		if (uu)
+			free(uu);
+		if (b)
+			sshbuf_free(b);
+		if (bb)
+			sshbuf_free(bb);
+
 		if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
 			error("%s: open %s: %s", __func__, _PATH_DEVNULL,
 			    strerror(errno));
diff --git a/ssh.h b/ssh.h
index c94633b..411ea86 100644
--- a/ssh.h
+++ b/ssh.h
@@ -97,3 +97,15 @@
 
 /* Listen backlog for sshd, ssh-agent and forwarding sockets */
 #define SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG		128
+
+/*
+ * Name of the environment variable containing the incoming key passed
+ * to AuthorizedKeysCommand.
+ */
+#define SSH_KEY_ENV_NAME "SSH_KEY"
+
+/*
+ * Name of the environment variable containing the incoming key fingerprint
+ * passed to AuthorizedKeysCommand.
+ */
+#define SSH_KEY_FINGERPRINT_ENV_NAME "SSH_KEY_FINGERPRINT"
diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
index 4e01855..60c676f 100644
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
@@ -1424,6 +1424,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	av = saved_argv;
 #endif
 
+	if (geteuid() == 0) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "this is a patched version of the sshd that must not be run as root.\n");
+		exit(1);
+	}
+
 	if (geteuid() == 0 && setgroups(0, NULL) == -1)
 		debug("setgroups(): %.200s", strerror(errno));
 
diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
index ef36d33..1d7bade 100644
--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
@@ -223,6 +223,11 @@ It will be invoked with a single argument of the username
 being authenticated, and should produce on standard output zero or
 more lines of authorized_keys output (see AUTHORIZED_KEYS in
 .Xr sshd 8 ) .
+The key being used for authentication (the key's type and the key text itself,
+separated by a space) will be available in the
+.Ev SSH_KEY
+environment variable, and the fingerprint of the key will be available in the
+.Ev SSH_KEY_FINGERPRINT environment variable.
 If a key supplied by AuthorizedKeysCommand does not successfully authenticate
 and authorize the user then public key authentication continues using the usual
 .Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
-- 
2.2.1